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TINO problems of importance in computer security are to I)  detect the presence 
of an intruder masquerading as the valid user and 2) detect the perpetration 
of abusive actions on the part of an otherwise innocuous user. In this paper we 
present a machine learning approach to anomaly detection, desigined to han- 
dle these two problems. Our system learns a user profile for each user account 
and subsequently employs it to detect anomalous behavior in that account. 
Based on sequences of actions (UNIX commands) of the current user's input 
sti:earn, the system compares each fixed-length input sequence with a histor- 
ical library of the account's command sequences using a similarity measure. 
Tlle system must learn to classify current behavior as consistent or anomalous 
with past behavior using only positive examples of the account's valid user. 
Our empirical results demonstrate that in most cases it is possib1.e to distin- 
gu.ish the legitimate user from an intruder and, furthermore, that an instance 
selection technique based on a memory page-replacement algorithm is capable 
of drastically reducing library size without hindering detection accuracy. 
Detecting the Abnormal: Machine Learning 
in Computer Security 
1 Introduction 
A long-standing problem in the field of computer security is that of intrusion 
detection [Anderson, 19801. According to Mukherjee et al. [1994], lthe problem 
is to identify "individuals who are using a computer system witliout autho- 
rization (crackers) and those who have legitimate access to the system but are 
abusing their privileges (the insider threat)." This problem is a subcase of the 
aizomaly detection problem, in which the goal is to identify anornalous situ- 
ations that may cause impairment in system usability through loss of data, 
denial of service, or invasion of privacy. Detecting anomalous behavior can 
be viewed as a binary valued classification problem in which measurements of 
system activity such as system log files, resource usage, command traces, and 
audit trails are used to produce a classification of the state of the system as 
normal or abnormal. 
In this paper we present a machine learning approach to anomaly detection 
designed to handle these two problems. Our system learns a user profile and 
subsequently employs it to detect anomalous behavior. Based on sequences of 
actions (UNIX commands) of the current user's input stream, the system clas- 
sifies current behavior as consistent or anomalous with past behavior. Creating 
such a system presents four challenging problems: 
a The definition of the class abnormal is often site or user dependent. 
a If we consider the problem of learning user profiles as a concept learning 
task, we face the difficulty that the profile must be formed from positive 
examples only. 
a There is potentially an unlimited amount of data available fi3r user pro- 
filing. 
a Changes in user behavior lead to concept drift, which must also be in- 
corporated into the user profile. 
This paper explores how to learn a user profile and how to employ the 
profile for anomaly detection. Our empirical results demonstrate that an ap- 
plroach based on ~rofiling a user through characteristic sequences of commands 
yields high detection accuracy. 
Learning a User Profile 
In order for the detection system to recognize anomalous behavior, it must 
first form a user profile to characterize normal behavior. In this section we 
describe the model underlying our approach to user profiling, and then discuss 
innplementation details of how user profiles are formed from comrnand data. 
2.1 Capturing the Casual Nature of User Actions 
Traditionally, in computer security, user profiles have been built based on 
cl.laracteristics such as resources consumed, typing rate, command issue rate, 
and counts of particular commands employed [Denning, 1987, Simaha, 1988, 
Frank, 19941. It is unclear how successful these approaches have been be- 
cause, although a number of applications have been fielded and are in use, to 
our knowledge rigorous comparative testing has yet to be perfornnedl. These 
approaches do not use the observation that human/computer interaction is 
essentially a causal process. Typically, a user has a goal to achieve when using 
the computer, which causes the person to issue certain commands, causing the 
computer to act in a certain manner. The computer's response, im turn, keys 
further actions on the part of the human. 
To form a user profile our approach learns characteristic sequences of ac- 
tions generated by users. The underlying hypothesis is that a user responds in 
a similar manner to similar situations, leading to  repeated sequence:s of actions. 
In.deed, the existence of command alias mechanisms in many UNIX command 
interpreters supports the idea that users tend to  perform many repeated sets 
of actions, and that these sequences difler on a per-user basis. It is the differ- 
ences in characteristic sequences that we attempt to use to differentiate a valid 
user from an intruder masquerading as that user. Note that the ,detection of 
arlomalous behavior is made more difficult because a malicious intruder may 
attempt to emulate the valid user's behavior, including alias and command 
usage. 
- 
'As reported by members of the COAST security research lab. COAST is a computer 
security laboratory in the Computer Science Department a t  Purdue University. 
2.2 Collecting Training Data to Form a User Profile 
To learn characteristic patterns of actions, our system uses the sequence (an 
ordered, fixed-length set of temporally adjacent actions) as the fundamental 
unit of comparison. For this research, actions were taken to be UNIX shell 
commands with their arguments, although the approach developed here is gen- 
eral and can be extended to any stream of discrete events such als operating 
system calls or graphical user interface events. For ease of data collection, 
the temporal order of commands was maintained only within the context of a 
single command interpreter (a shell). Currently, we preserve command names 
artd argument switches but omit the specific file names associated with each 
cclmmand execution. This decision was based on the intuition that the signif- 
ic,ant facet of the user's command history for this work was behavior rather 
th.an content. Thus, it should be more useful to note that the user invoked the 
command emacs (a text editor) with the behavioral switch -nu (-run in text- 
mode rather than initialize the X-windows interface) and two file names, than 
it would be to take note of the actual file names used. Clearly, for some ap- 
plications of misuse detection, important information could be extracted from 
the filenames (directories in which the user typically works, for example). 
We envision our anomaly detection system as a personal softwa,re assistant 
that helps monitor a user's account for penetrations. Because of privacy issues, 
artd the fact that it is impossible to characterize the full space of user behav- 
iors, only positive examples of the account owner's behavior are available for 
tr.aining. 
Norton has explored sequence learning for DNA sequences [Norton, 19941, 
but his data had both positive and negative training examples. The anomaly 
detection domain differs from traditional concept formation tasks in that one 
must characterize user behavior from "positive" examples only. To resolve this 
difficulty we invoked the closed world assumption - that anything not seen in 
the historical data represents a different user. Indeed, one goal of this research 
wits to examine the appropriateness of the closed world assumption for the 
anomaly detection domain. Intuitively, it seems likely that this is a. reasonable 
assumption - the very terms anomaly, abnormal, and unusual imply that 
divergence from past behavior is an important indication of trouble. 
2.3 The Data Collection System 
T~D collect user action data, we created a parser for the UNIX c:sh family of 
laaguages (including t c sh )  which translates the raw data stream of the shell 
command trace into a token stream suitable for storage and comparison. This 
translation suppresses filenames, as described above, but preserves command 
names, argument switches2, and other syntactically import ant symbols such 
as I , ; , and >& ! . For example, the command stream: 
> 1s -1aF 
> cd /tmp 
> gunzip -c f o 0 . t a r . g ~  I (cd \" ; t a r  xf -1 
w'ould be translated by the parser into the token stream: 
1s -1aF cd <1> gunzip -c <I> I ( cd <1> ; tar - <I> ) 
where the token <I> denotes the occurrence of a single filename argument3. 
The parser also introduces the tokens **SOF** and **EOF** indicating start 
and end of a command interpreter session, respectively. 
During training, the processed token stream is stored verbatim in the 
liiirary. The library is an instance database that, together witln a similar- 
it:y measure and a set of system parameters (described below), cmonstitutes a 
user's profile. Similar to instance based learning, a design criterion is whether 
one collects all available data or performs some type of instance selection 
[Aha, et al., 1991, Lewis & Catlett, 19941. We explore a strategy for instance 
selection in Section 5. 
Detecting Anamolous Behavior 
Once a user profile is formed, the basic action of the detection system is to 
compare incoming input sequences to the historical data and for111 an opinion 
2Strictly speaking, the parser depends upon the UNIX convention that argument switches 
are prefixed with a dash, so the '-laF' switch in the command 1s -1aF ${HCIHE} would be 
correctly recognized, but the switch tvf  in the command tar  tvf  /tmp/f oo . t a r  would not 
be. This is not taken to be a serious weakness, however, as the dash convention is widely 
used. 
3 ~ u l t i p l e  filenames are replaced by an appropriately numbered token. For example, the 
pa.rser would emit a set of five filename arguments as <5> 
as to whether or not they both represent the same user. The fundamental 
unit of comparison in the anomaly detector system is the command sequence. 
Dietterich and Michalski [I9961 have studied the problem of learning to predict 
sequences by fitting sequence data to a model from a space of possjble models. 
Tlieir goal was to create a system that could predict subsequent actions in the 
sequence, whereas our goal is to classify sequences of new actions as consistent 
or inconsistent with sequence history. To this end, all input token streams 
are segmented into overlapping sequences of tokens (where the length of each 
sequence is a parameter to the system, but is fixed for a single run). Two 
sequences can be compared using a similarity measure. 
3,,1 Computing Sequence Similarity 
0:ne approach to learning from sequence data is to convert the data into feature 
vectors by accumulating measures of the individual sequences [Hirsh & Japkowicz, 1994, 
Sahberg, 19951. Then one can apply any off the shelf classifier construction 
algorithm such as a neural network or a decision tree to the feat,ure vectors 
that describe the sequence data. By contrast, our approach uses a measure of 
similarity between sequences to compare current input to historicis1 data. 
A number of possible methods exist for measuring the similarity of two 
sesquences. The most straightforward is the equality function, which yields 
TRUE when both sequences match in every position and FALSE otherwise. This 
is the similarity function employed by string matching algorithms and has the 
ad.vantage of being widely studied and highly optimizable. For example, the 
UIVIX d i f f  program employs this form of matching. Srikant and Agrawal 
[1!396] use a modified equality matching function to detect frequently occuring 
selquences in large data sets; they allow gaps, or intervening non-matching 
elements, in their sequence detection. In our domain, the difficulty is that for 
loing sequences the probability of locating exact matches in historical command 
da.ta becomes exceedingly low. Thus, the equality function is not a viable 
choice for this particular domain. 
Our system, therefore, computes a numerical similarity measure that re- 
turns a high value for pairs of sequences that it believes to have close resem- 
bl,ance, and a low value to pairs of sequences that it believes largely differ. The 
individual elements of the sequences are from an unordered set, which creates 
a matching problem identical to that of symbolic features for IBL. However, 
unlike IBL, our similarity measure is judging the similarity between two se- 
quences rather than two feature vectors. The similarity measure is based on 
the intuition that token matches separated by interleaving tokeins are more 
liltely to have occurred by chance, while adjacent matches are mlore likely to 
hiwe occurred due to a causal process. Therefore if sequence Seq, lnas k tokens 
in common with each of Seq, and Seq,, but the common tokens are adjacent in 
Seq, and Seq, then we would like the similarity measure to have t'he property 
that Sim(Seq, , Seq,) > Sim(Seq, , Seq,). To this end our similarity measure 
assigns similarity scores, Sim(Seq,, Seq,) as follows: 
Set an adjacency counter, c := 1 and the value of the measure, Sim := 0. 
For each position, i, in the sequence length: 
- If Seq,(i) = Seq,(i) then Sim := Sim + c and increment c by 1. 
- Otherwise, c := 1. 
After all positions are examined, return the measure value. 
T:his measure yields a higher score for more similar sequences, bounded be- 
tween 0 and n(n + 1)/2 (where n is the sequence length) and bii~sed toward 
adjacent identical tokens rather than identical tokens separated by some non- 
matching intermediate tokens. We chose a polynomial upper-bound for our 
sequence measure based on the observation that the elements in a command 
sequence are not independent. ( If they were independent then a similarity 
based on a function that grows exponentially with the number of matching 
tokens would make more sense.) Thus, the pair of sequences shown below on 
th.e left would have a higher similarity value than would the pair cln the right. 
1:: <I> ; vi 
1s <I> cat <3> 
1s -1 <I> ; 
1s -a <I> cat 
We define the similarity of a single sequence Seq; to a set of sequences L as: 
Sim(Seq;, L) = max {Sim(Seq;, Seqj)) 
Seq EL 
T:hus, the similarity of a sequence to the user library is the mea:jure of that 
sequence compared to the most similar sequence in the library. 
Figure 1: Similarity measure stream. (a) Raw. (b) Smoothed. 
3..2 Classifying User Behavior 
Given an input stream of command tokens parsed by the data collection mod- 
ule, the detection module classifies the current user as normal or anomalous 
after each token. The output of the detection module is a stream of binary 
decisions indicating, at  each point in the input command data, whether or not 
it believes that the input stream at that point was generated by the profiled 
user. 
To make these decisions, the detection module first calculates the similar- 
ity of each input sequence to  the user's library, yielding a stream of similarity 
measures. In an intuitive sense, this stream represents the familiarity of the 
input commands at each time step, given knowledge about the previous behav- 
io.r of the user. In preliminary experiments, we discovered that the similarity 
value stream produced by comparison of test data to a user profile was noisy 
and erratic (see Figure 1, (a)).  The noisiness of the raw similarity measure 
stream can be attributed to normal deviations in actions on the parts of the 
users, as well as to random elements (pre-empting work to deal with urgent 
e--mail, for example). Although explainable, this variance in the similarity 
measure makes it impossible to detect anomalous behavior from a single se- 
quence. (The profiled user sporadically has very low similarity with their own 
past behavior.) 
Based on the hypothesis that, while individual sequences may d.eviate from 
historical precedent, aggregate behavior should largely conform lto historical 
behavior for valid users but should still noticeably deviate for iritruders, we 
applied a smoothing filter to the data (see Figure 1, (b)). The smoothing 
filter we applied was a windowed mean-value filter, which at sequence i of the 
input stream is defined by: 
where L is the user profile library and w is the window length. 
After smoothing the similarity measure stream, the detection module makes 
a classification of the input stream as being normal or abnormal at the point 
occurring at the end of the current window. In the current implementation, 
th~e classification is made with a threshold decision: if the mean-value of the 
current window is greater than the threshold, classify the current window as 
normal, otherwise classify it as abnormal. This threshold is a parameter of 
th.e system and the choice of its value is discussed in the next section. 
4 Experiment 1: Proof of Concept 
To evaluate our approach to anomaly detection, we performed a,n empirical 
evaluation to determine if the false positive and false negative rates of our 
system were acceptable. The requirement that a security system not be in- 
trusive dictates that the accuracy of an anomaly-detection systern should be 
very high (or, more specifically, the false negative rate - the occurrence of 
misclassifications of harmless or normal actions as anomalous -- should be 
low). Depending on site and security policy, false alarms can disrupt the work 
of system administrators or users. If the system is constantly flagging valid 
users as abnormal it will quickly gain the distrust of both users and system 
aclministrators, much in the same way that the 'boy who cried wolf' lost the 
trust of his townspeople, and that car alarms are often ignored. The level 
of accuracy depends on the security policies of the site in question; a more 
security-conscious site may be willing to accept a higher false alarrn rate in or- 
der to gain a higher rate of detections of actual system abuses. Therefore, the 
detection threshold of the classification system should also be a configurable 
parameter. 
Convergence c u ~ e s  lor USER3 
30 
Figure 2: Impact of window length on mean sequence measure 
4.1 The Data 
The data examined in this research were a set of UNIX4 shell co~nmand his- 
tories from four members of the Purdue MILLENNIUM lab, spanning a time 
period of approximately four months (a little more than an academilc semester). 
The users varied in experience and academic histories, but all were graduate 
students with considerable computer experience. Additionally, all users used 
tc .sh and worked extensively in the X-windows environment, which may well 
halve influenced the type of data patterns produced. Over the course of data 
collection, we accumulated 7,769 tokens from USERO, 23,293 from USER1, 
12,585 from USER2, and 22,530 from USER3. 
4,.2 System Parameters 
A:; discussed in Section 3, there are several parameters in our a,pproach to 
anomaly detection. This section describes each in detail and gives the rational 
for our choices in the experiments that follow. 
Sequence length: We discovered that the number of tokens per sequence had 
4Sun Microsystem's Solaris 2.5 running on Sun Ultra SPARC workstatio~ns and Linux 
2.0 running on Intel i486-based and DEC Alpha-based workstations. 
a dramatic impact on performance. Early investigations revealed that lengths 
of 5 and 15 yielded generally poor accuracy, while a length of 10 resulted 
in much higher accuracy. These values suggested an experimental range for 
sequence lengths of 8 to 12 tokens. 
Window length: The number of sequences included in a window of obser- 
va.tion for the testing module was set to 80 sequences (80 tokens + n tokens, 
for sequence length n) based on early examinations of the windowed-mean 
snloothing filter. Figure 2 displays the average window value for all window 
sizes in the range [0..1750] for each user. By visual inspection we determined 
that separation occurs for window lengths of approximately 80 or more se- 
quences. Since the window size determines the shortest interval in which the 
system can detect an intruder, we attempted to select the smallest window 
that yielded discrimination. From these curves, it is clear that using this sim- 
ila,rity measure allows the valid user's behavior to be discriminated from that 
of other users. Unfortunately, limited data precluded independent verification 
of this value (we used all four users' data to select this window length). Since 
this is likely to be a user specific parameter, future work will address how to 
customize this choice to the particular user. 
Cllassification threshold: This value was set based on initial clbservations 
at a value of 15 for all experiments. In Figure 2, we see that after 80 tokens 
thresholding at 15 discriminates that valid user from the invalid users. USER3 
is the user profiled and the top curve shows the similarity measure for their 
actions recorded in the test data. A single setting is crude becausle the upper 
bound of the similarity measure varies according to the sequence length. In 
future work we will investigate the sensitivity of the results to this parameter. 
Library size: Initially, all available training data was allocated to the library, 
bu.t in order to examine the amount of data required to profile a user, and to 
examine the possibilities of selectively pruning instances, library sizes of 50, 
200, 500, 1000, and 2000 sequences were tested. 
4.3 Experimental Met hod 
Wle examined the performance of the base-line system across the parameters 
given in Section 4.2. For the purposes of this domain, we define the detection 
accuracy or true detection rate to be the number of input windovvs correctly 
ca-tegorized as normal or abnormal (originating with the profiled user or not). 
The data sets were divided into train (from which the user library was created) 
and test at a split of 213 to 113, respectively. To obtain the desired library sizes 
(50, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000 sequences), the system truncated tlne training 
data to the desired number of sequences, keeping the oldest data (i.e. the 
earliest records available for each user). In addition, we varied the length 
of sequences examined from 8 to 12 tokens. For each user, library size, and 
sequence length, we created a user profile sequence library and then measured 
the detection accuracy for the test data from each of the four users. 
4.4 Results 
This experiment was intended largely as a proof-of-concept system, and as such 
we were interested in answering the following questions: 1) Is the closed world 
assumption appropriate for this domain? 2) What is the effect of sequence 
length on detection accuracy? and 3) Is the optimal library size dependent on 
user? 
Closed world assumption: A central hypothesis of our anomaly detection 
system is that user patterns are sufficiently consistent, for a singlce user, yet 
sufhciently disparate, when measured between users, that differentiation is 
possible. In this experiment we show that differentiation is, in fact, possible 
within the scope of our test data. Table 1 displays the detection results for 
all pairwise tests of user profiles and users with sequence length of 12 and a 
library size of 2000 sequences. Recall that the test data sets are 113 of the 
total user data, as given in Section 4.1. 
The user from whom the profile was generated is listed in the leftmost 
column, while the user from whom the test data was generated is listed across 
the topmost row. The numbers in the table are percentages of windows that the 
detection system identified as the profiled user. Ideally, the diagonal elements 
of t,he table (true positive rates) should be 100% and the off-diagonal1 elements 
(false positive rates) should be 0%. 
These results demonstrate that the recognition system has higher true pos- 
itive than false positive rates. Furthermore, in some cases (USElRl tested 
against USER0 and USER2 tested against USER1, for example), the false 
negative rate is lower than the false positive rate. This is a desirable charac- 
teristic as false negatives make the system less usable (due to the annoyance of 
false alarms). We take these results as evidence that the closed world assump- 
tion is appropriate for at least some users in this domain, although we note 







Table 2: USERO's test data tested against USERO's profile 
thrtt the users involved in this study are all fairly to extremely elxperienced 
computer users. The question of whether or not the techniques presented here 
would apply equally well to novice users is still open. 
Tested User 
The effect of sequence length on detection accuracy: Our experiments 
were designed to examine the impact of sequence length on detection rate, as 
well as the question of whether optimal sequence length is user 'dependent. 
Foic brevity, the full set of experimental results is omitted here, but Table 2 
displays some typical trends. The numbers in this table are percentages of 
the input stream identified as USERO input (equivalent to detection accuracy 
for this case). The column headings are library size and the row headings are 
seq,uence length. 
A positive relation between sequence length and detection rate is seen over 
the range of sequences examined in this experiment. As mentioned earlier, 
this trend reverses at longer sequence lengths. We also noted thalt the false 
positive rate increases (erroneously classifying normal behavior as a,nomalous) 
when the sequence length increases. 
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Ta,ble 3: Profiled users (SELF) versus all other users for various library sizes. 
SELF 
size of 500 sequences for this user, and, simultaneously, the library size of 500 
sequences represents a dramatic accuracy improvement over a library size of 
2010 sequences. When we examined the usage patterns for the library elements, 
we found that, even when the library size is unrestricted, only 850 library se- 
quences are ever selected as 'most similar' to an input sequence. It is probable 
that, for this user, most of the behavioral information is contained in a few 








Optimal library size: The observation that much information is contained 
in relatively few instances for USERO leads to the question of whether optimal 
library size is invariant of the user profiled. Tables 3 (a)-(d) suggest that ideal 
library size is user specific. In these tables, the column headings indicate the 
size of the library used in the user profile, while the row headings indicate the 
test set under examination. 'SELF' denotes a test of the user's data against 
that same user's profile. The numbers in the table are percentages of the 
input stream detected as the same as the profile. Thus, the ideal values for 
tht: 'SELF' row are 100% and the ideal values for other rows are O'%. 
It appears that, while for USERO most of the important behavioral data 
is extracted within 500 sequences, for USER3 significant information is still 





















accuracies do not appear to asymptote on this range of sequences. There are a 
two possible explanations for this behavior. The first is that users 1, 2, and 3 
are also characterized by a small number of sequences, but that those sequences 
occur infrequently, and thus require a larger sample to acquire. Under this 
hypothesis, it is possible that a single library size is applicable to all users, 
and that the important sequences occurred early for USER0 more-or-less by 
chance. Alternatively, it is possible that different library sizes are necessary 
for superior performance for different users. This issue is complicated by the 
result that the false positive rate seems to increase with increasing library size; 
it is desirable to maintain the smallest acceptable library for accuiracy as well 
as resource reasons. 
Experiment 2: Instance Selection 
The amount of data that is available for examination on a per-user basis is 
potentially staggering. If the granularity of examination is reduced to the 
level of individual operating system calls, the data stream could well amount 
to thousands, or even millions, of data per second. If the anomaly-detection 
sy4stem is to run real-time then it is imperative that the system be both fast 
and resource conservative (history has shown that a security measure that is 
suficiently obtrusive will not actually be used, and will, therefore, be useless.) 
This implies that much of the available data must be discarded with little or 
no examination. 
5.1 The LRU Instance Selection Algorithm 
The experiments reported in Section 4 provided evidence that optimal library 
size is user dependent. This suggests that a gain in resource efficiency can be 
made by discarding some historical command data. The hypothesis that some 
sequences are more characteristic of a user's behavior than others suggests 
a possible strategy for deleting unnecessary sequences. We note, first, that 
th'e algorithm employed in the first experiment selects only a singlle historical 
sequence as most similar to a given input sequence. If we assunne that the 
characteristics of a user's behavior change relatively slowly, we can invoke 
locality of reference to predict that recently matched library sequences will be 
usNed again for detection in the near future. This suggests an analogy to tasks in 
operating systems, such as page replacement, in which some resources must be 
discarded in favor of others. To examine this analogy, we modified the anomaly 
detection system from Experiment 1 to employ the least-recently-used (LRU) 
diiscard strategy. Under this strategy, a set of pruning sequences (separate 
from both train and test sequences) are selected and used to rnark which 
sesquences in the library are used for detection. As each pruning sequence is 
examined, the library instance selected as most similar is time-stamped. After 
al.1. pruning data is processed, the library is reduced to the desired size by 
removing the least-recently-used sequences. The resulting pruned library is 
then employed as the user profile to classify input streams. Strictly speaking, 
LIlU is an iterative algorithm, while our implementation for these experiments 
was batch mode. 
5.2 Experiment a1 Verification 
The experimental runs described in Section 4 were repeated, with the ex- 
ceptions that 1) library size was achieved with the LRU instance selection 
algorithm rather than library truncation and that 2) of the 1/3 of user data 
reserved for testing, only 1000 sequences were used as test data foi- each user, 
th'e rest being employed as pruning data. Characteristic results a,re given in 
Ta.bles 4 (a)-(d). The format of these tables is identical to the format of 
Ta.bles 3 (a)-(d). 
For USER2 and USERS, these results display a dramatic increase in true 
detection rate, accompanied by a decrease in false positive rate. USERO, on 
the other hand, experiences a slight drop in true positive rate for large library 
sizes, along with increases in false negative rate in some cases. There are two 
noteworthy features of USERO's results. The first is that the true detection 
rate (the SELF rate) for a library size of 200 elements is much greater than 
for the equivalent entry in Table 3 (improved by 50 percentage points). This 
suggests that the LRU pruning algorithm can be useful even for this user. It 
als,o suggests, however, that the LRU selection technique might as,ymptote at 
lower accuracies for the other users as well, if the experiments were extended to 
cover larger library sizes. The second interesting factor in Table 4 for USERO is 
that,  while false positive rates increased with respect to USER1, they declined 
or remained constant with respect to USER2 and USER3. This raises the 
~ o s s i b i l i t ~  hat the optimal instance selection scheme is not merely a function 
of the user being profiled, but also of the intruder. 
200 500 1-1 
SELF 28.3 89.8 100.0 100.0 
USER0 2.1 15.4 
USER2 0.0 1.3 
Table 4: Results of LRU instance selection. 
(b) 
6 Conclusioiis and Future Work 
SELF 
This research has demonstrated a number of points. The first is that sequence 
leaxning can be a valuable technique in the domain of anomaly detection for 
user recognition in computer security. The experiments have provided empir- 
ica.1 evidence that the optimal library size is a function of the p:rofiled user 
an'd further that an instance selection system can lead to increased perfor- 
mance. We found that the least-recently-used instance selection technique 
yields substantial performance benefits for some users in our test sets, but 
not universally. This points the way toward investigation of oth'er instance 
selection techniques for the security anomaly detection domain. 
There are a number of directions available at  this point for future research. 
It js possible that greater accuracy can be achieved by replacing the mean-value 
smoothing operation (Section 3.1) with a different noise-suppression algorithm. 
Similarly, it might be beneficial to apply a more sophisticated discrimination 
test than comparison to a constant threshold value (see Section 3.2). In future 
research we will investigate methods for setting the value of the window length 
and the detection threshold, on a per-user basis, by examining statistics of the 
user's smoothed input sequence and setting the threshold in accorldance with 
a pre-selected false negative tolerance level. In addition we plan to investigate 
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One potential problem that this research has not addressed is, that as time 
passes, normal user actions will change - they will use different applications or 
read the UNIX manual. This means that some of the old sequence data will 
no longer accurately reflect the user's behavior. To handle this concept drift 
[Schlimmer, 19871 a method is needed to remove out-of-date data sequences 
from the library similar to removing instances from instance-based learning 
systems [Moore, 19901. Fortunately, these sequences can be detected as they 
are older and will not have been recently used in matching (new behavior 
looks different). A focus of future work will be to explore the LRU method for 
adapting user-profiles to concept drift. 
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